Why I like the moral argument for God (and why Grayling gets it wrong)

In this blog I explain why I particularly like the moral argument as advanced by the Christian philosopher Linda Zagzebski.


“A moral world is… very probable on theism.”

[Agnostic philosopher Paul Draper in Greg Ganssle, “Necessary Moral Truths” Philosophia Christi, NS 2, 2/1 (2000): 111]

Like Draper, I think that arguments from morality can be some of the most powerful arguments for the existence of a God. Yet they are also some of the worst understood arguments when listening to atheists and theists interact (especially on the internet). The first thing to realize is what moral arguments are claiming and what they are not. Some ‘nots’ to begin with:

  • They are not claiming theists are more moral than atheists.
  • They are not claiming atheists cannot be moral people.
  • They are not claiming atheists cannot know anything about morality.
  • They are not claiming atheists cannot have some good reasons for their moral choices.
  • They are not claiming morality cannot arise through natural processes.
  • They are not claiming ‘objective’ morals are, or have to be, universally agreed.

Most supposed ‘refutations’ of the moral argument on the internet only attend to these six straw men. Unfortunately it’s not just internet atheists who get this argument wrong or who oversimplify it. In Anthony Grayling’s recent book The God Question he talks for a few pages about this argument (or it might be better to say they are a family of arguments just like cosmological arguments). Grayling gives a brief quote from the Christian philosopher Leibniz in support of a point he is making (even though Leibniz would have disagreed with what Grayling is contending overall) and Immanuel Kant in just one sentence! That is the entire extent to which he engages with Christian philosophers on the moral argument. Is it little wonder then that Grayling begins his treatment of the issue by declaring:

The God Argument

“What of the moral argument for the existence of a deity? Stated at its simplest, it is that there can be no morality unless there is a deity. Put a little more fully, the argument in effect says that there can be no moral code unless it is laid down, policed, punished and rewarded by a deity… Or, alternatively put again: because god is so nice, we should be nice to each other.”

Not a very clear beginning. Does he mean that Christian philosophers are claiming there could be absolutely no moral discourse without God? Or rather that there could be no moral opinions without God? Or perhaps that people cannot be good without a God as the foundation of their morals? Or is it that he thinks the argument is saying people cannot make up subjective codes without God? Frankly it’s not at all clear enough to know. What is clear is that he is not citing any Christian philosophers directly as a way of engaging with the argument.

Grayling then almost gets the argument correct when he states:

“…it consists in saying that morality is groundless unless ordained…”

But then he ignores that point, both in explanation and in critique, by returning to the parody when he states the moral argument is:

“The argument that there can be no morality unless policed by a deity is refuted by the existence of good atheists.” [Emphasis mine.]

Now I am only a lowly graduate in theology/philosophy of religion but I am not aware of one single Christian philosopher who has made a moral argument on the basis that morality needs ‘policing’. How can it be that such a well regarded professional philosopher (as Grayling clearly is) could get the moral argument so obtuse at best and so horribly wrong at worst? I don’t have an answer to that question but I can demonstrate he is parodying the argument and this is why.

The problem is Grayling does not make any specific references to whose arguments he is citing. That is often a good indication that the person is likely to be oversimplifying the matter. If there are theists making such moral arguments then I admit I have not heard of them. So who are these theists? Grayling does not tell us. Not one reference to a person, popular level book or philosophical paper. Nothing. Absolutely nothing (for any Kraussians out there)!

A very famous theist and a philosopher whom Grayling has actually debated, William Lane Craig, does articulate one version of the moral argument yet Grayling either ignores or somehow is not aware of it (although this is hard to believe given that he is a professional philosopher). Craig’s argument is expressed briefly in the syllogism:

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.

2. Objective moral values and duties do exist.

3. Therefore, God exists.

Now clearly, this argument is not addressed by Grayling at all. But even worse is that Craig specifically rejects many of the parodies offered by Grayling. Craig replies to someone on his website asking questions on these matters and says:

“It was no part of my argument that God is necessary to explain our moral sense of right and wrong, good and evil. Over and over again in the debate I carefully distinguished between moral ontology (questions about the reality of moral values) and moral epistemology (questions about how we come to know moral values), and I said that my argument is solely about the objective reality of moral values, not how we come to know them. I’ll appeal to all the same mechanisms that you appeal to in order to explain how you know that (2) is true. In point of fact, Spencer, I don’t think that we need to appeal to God at all to know that objective moral values and duties exist, so you’re just barking up the wrong tree insofar as I’m concerned.”

So when Grayling parodies the argument by saying there can be no morality without a deity as if that were the argument he is not even getting a popular form of the argument correctly represented. It has to be said that this is hugely disappointing.

It is also concerning that many who discuss the moral argument do not appear to know what ‘objective ethics’ or ‘moral realism’ are so some important definitions are needed at this point:

“Moral realism is the theory that moral judgements enjoy a special sort of objectivity: such as judgements, where true, are so independently of what any human being, anywhere, in any circumstance whatever, thinks of them.”

(Russ Shafer-Landau – ‘Moral Realism – A Defense’ p.2)

“Realism holds that moral judgements can be true or false, that sometimes they are true and that what makes them true is independent from people’s (or groups of people’s) beliefs, judgements or desires.”

(Andrew Fisher – Metaethics: An Introduction’ p.77)

“If moral realism is false and late-term abortions do not have either the property of being right or the property of being wrong, then it is hard to see why we cannot accept that we both could be right. In other words, we might think that moral realism is the best explanation for why we hold that to act cannot be both right and not-right, both good and not-good and so on.”

(Fisher – Metaethics: An Introduction’ p.59)

“Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common (and more or less defining) ground of moral realism.”

(Geoff Sayre-McCord – Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy article on Moral Realism, 2009)

This is how we are, and how we ought, to use the language of ‘objective morality’ or ‘moral realism’ and how they are being used here in this post.

It is also important to point out that most moral arguments are about ontology and not epistemology (which I hint at in my third bullet point above). One could give a completely evolutionary account of how morality arose in homo sapiens (be it via empathy or social conditioning etc.) and the moral arguments for God would still run. The reason is because they are not arguments about how we came to have morals as a species but rather how we justify them as being objective philosophically now we know them to be objective.

People who are not regular readers of philosophy of religion may be surprised to find out that moral arguments for the existence of God are taken extremely seriously by atheist philosophers (especially those within the field of philosophy of religion). Mackie, Martin, Le Poidevin, Brink and Everitt (just to name a few) all take the argument very seriously and this attitude should filter its way down into lay atheism more than it has as of yet.

There was a time (between 50-100 years ago) when divine command theory had fallen out of favour within professional philosophy but, as the philosopher Andrew Fisher notes, it has since made quite a comeback:

“Over the past twenty or so years divine command theory has become increasingly popular; whereas it was once thought that secular liberalism had crushed all life from the theory, periodicals and books are once again being populated with discussions about the possible link between God and morality.”

‘Metaethics: An Introduction’ p.76

This is nothing short of astonishing given how popular various forms of naturalism are currently in western philosophy. Fisher is not saying that divine command theory (DCT) is becoming more popular amongst general culture or non-philosophers but that the shift is taking place in academic philosophical circles. This should give those who are not philosophers and who immediately reply with disdain and contempt to DCTs a serious moment of pause.

So far we have set some context and attempted to clarify what the moral arguments are / are not. So what might such an argument look like?

Christian philosopher Linda Zagzebski formulates her moral argument like this:

i) Morality is a rational enterprise.

ii) Morality would not be rational if moral skepticism were true.

iii) There is much too much unresolved moral disagreement for us to suppose that moral skepticism can be avoided if human sources of moral knowledge are all that we have.

iv) Therefore we must assume that there is an extra-human, divine source of moral wisdom.


NB. Regarding premise ii) it should be noted exactly what Zagzebski means:

“The skepticism I am talking about is extensive and drastic, not the innocuous amount of skepticism that is healthy and no doubt required by intellectual honesty and modesty.”

The aim of her paper is, in her own words:

“I am attempting to give a moral argument for the rationality of theistic belief. If I am right, then God’s existence makes the moral life rational. God’s existence does this whether the people who deliberate about and attempt to live a moral life know it or not.”

She also points out that her argument can be run as a reductio ad absurdum:

“If all I have to go on morally is my own moral intuitions and reasoning and the intuitions and reasoning of others, then I am rationally led to skepticism about the possibility of moral knowledge. Furthermore, my experience and that of others leads me to be skeptical of a person’s ability to follow moral beliefs. In addition, it is rational to be skeptical of human moral power in the sense that we can, by acting individually and collectively, bring about good and prevent evil in the world. The assumption of this argument therefore leads me to a very extensive moral skepticism, amounting actually to moral despair. But such despair cannot be rational. Therefore, the assumption of the argument must be false and I must be able to rely on more than my own human powers and those of others in attempting to live a moral life.”

[‘Does Ethics need God?’ (‘Faith and Philosophy’)

“In this paper I have given a moral argument for the rationality of belief in the Christian God. I have assumed that it is rational to try to be moral, but given certain problems in the moral life, it is not rational unless certain conditions obtain those conditions which free a person from the three forms of skepticism I have discussed. The argument is Kantian in its general structure since, like Kant, the claim is that moral endeavor presupposes the existence of something like God as a condition for the rational possibility of its achievement. Theistic belief is, therefore, justified in the practical domain of reason. I have not argued, though, that belief in the Christian God is the only conceivable way to provide the conditions necessary for making moral effort rational, but it has no competitors that I know of. It follows that the theist is acting more rationally than the non-theist when they both act on their moral beliefs and claim that those beliefs are: justified. Since most non-theists do not hesitate to do this, it follows that it would be more rational for them to believe in God than not to.”

Premise i) is not controversial in the slightest. If someone wishes to assert (because they would not be allowed to reason it without contradicting themselves) that moral discourse is not open to reason then one would need to have a different discussion with such a person.

Premise ii) is talking about hyperbolic scepticism. Again this is likely to be agreed by all.

Premise iii) is the more likely premise to be attacked by the person not agreeing with this moral argument to God. I don’t think there are very good reasons to deny it however. It is important one remember that Zagzebski is not claiming that there have not been certain morals which have not been agreed upon across cultures but rather the fact that there have been so many differing attempts to suggest WHY such actions are wrong or right. People, not only throughout history and differing cultures but also in the same cultures and in modern times, have come to so many differing moral foundations that this raises a serious quandary: Why think one opinion is any better than another? Some will immediately appeal to notions of ‘happiness’ (as Sam Harris has recently done following, it should be said, certain already existing schools of utilitarian thought) but is ‘happiness’ any more agreed as a concept than ‘good’? Has Harris not just replaced one ambiguity with another (despite the fact that he may move in social circles where there appears to be wide agreement on what constitutes happiness)? But this is merely one of hundreds of possible naturalist explanations. So the importance here is to point out that a non-theistic account of morality ought to, if consistently thought out, lead us to hyperbolic moral scepticism. This is clearly what has happened to many atheist philosophers especially in the last two hundred years. Nietszche is widely recognized as being the atheist who saw this most clearly in his insistence that to reject Christianity would also mean a complete overhaul in all matters of value and ethics. Many others have followed Nietzsche in this conclusion and even those who have not often admit to the wide divergence of views regarding morality. Philosopher John Rist has written that there is “widely admitted to be a crisis in contemporary Western debate about ethical foundations.” [‘Real Ethics’ p.1] The reason for this conclusion is because despite the huge efforts of naturalists to account for objective morality there a plethora of theories regarding how this is to be achieved and naturalists disagree themselves on how to achieve such grounding. So in order to refute premise iii) one would not only need to point to a naturalist account for the proper grounding of objective morals but that theory would need to command significant agreement amongst moral philosophers.

Premise iv) follows if premise iii) cannot be refuted. If one wishes to hold onto some form of objectivity in ethics then the foundation has to be something other than merely human minds that hugely disagree on such matters.

This is, I would suggest, why many modern atheist philosophers have attempted to wander away from moral realism. They see the obvious consequences of holding to the view that there are things which really are wrong. Objective morals and duties are not explained well by any naturalist hypothesis and the sheer volume of attempts to do so is evidence of their resounding failure.

The atheist philosopher J.L. Mackie once noted:

“…we might well argue that objective intrinsically prescriptive features, supervening upon natural ones, constitute so odd a cluster of qualities and relations that they are most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of events, without an all-powerful god to create them. If, then, there are such intrinsically prescriptive objective values, they make the existence of god more probable than it would have been without them.”

[‘The Miracle of Theism’ pp.115,116]

Contrast that quote made in 1982 with this one by the philosopher John Cottingham in 2009:

“…it is very striking how the popularity of the subjectivist creeds has faded in more recent times. Relativistic views of truth turned out to be self-defeating; while in ethics, subjectivism ran into a host of logical difficulties and is now one the wane, eclipsed by a growing number of neo-objectivist theories. To everyone’s surprise, the growing consensus among philosophers is that some kind of objectivism of truth and of value is correct.”

[‘Why Believe?’ p.27]

A number of philosophers, as well as the survey over at ‘PhilPapers’, note that moral realism is by far the most agreed metaethical position accepted among philosophical academics today. The anti-realism of Mackie and others has widely been rejected. Perhaps this is one reason why the argument for God based on morality is enjoying such prominence again?

PS. An important note on the scope of the argument: One should note that Zagzebski’s argument is not intended as a ‘proof’ of God’s existence, as is the norm amongst theistic philosophers in general, but rather a demonstration of the rationality of believing in God since this hypothesis better explains the phenomenon of rational moral discourse. It is therefore more likely that God exists given this phenomenon than he does not and therefore it is more likely that God exists than he does not.

PPS. I intend to post on reasons why we should think moral realism is true soon.

Zagzebski’s full paper:


About aRemonstrant'sRamblings

I graduated in philosophy of religion many years ago and have since acquired my PGCE and now teach religion, ethics and philosophy.
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13 Responses to Why I like the moral argument for God (and why Grayling gets it wrong)

  1. “A number of philosophers, as well as the survey over at ‘PhilPapers’, note that moral realism is by far the most agreed metaethical position accepted amongst philosophical academics today. The anti-realism of Mackie and others has widely been rejected.”
    I think this is far too strong, considering that the survey you cite barely claims more realists than non-realists among all respondents (reproduced below. If you are using narrower parameters, you should say so).
    Accept or lean toward: moral realism 1694 / 3226 (52.5%)
    Accept or lean toward: moral anti-realism 997 / 3226 (30.9%)
    Insufficiently familiar with the issue 130 / 3226 (4.0%)
    Agnostic/undecided 86 / 3226 (2.7%)
    Accept an intermediate view 81 / 3226 (2.5%)
    Accept another alternative 58 / 3226 (1.8%)
    The question is too unclear to answer 53 / 3226 (1.6%)
    Skip 48 / 3226 (1.5%)
    Reject both 42 / 3226 (1.3%)
    There is no fact of the matter 15 / 3226 (0.5%)
    Other 11 / 3226 (0.3%)
    Accept both 11 / 3226 (0.3%)

  2. michaelstheology says:

    Thanks Tarn.

    Your figures appear to correspond to the ‘all respondents’ categories for both population and AOS. There is an obvious problem with that statistic. It does not tell us who these people are and what their qualifications are. Since ‘undergraduates’ is a sub-category within the search engine we know that they are at least involved and if we are broadening out that far we are venturing into those who have only just begun studying ethics. I don’t think most academics would put much weight into what undergraduates think as a bar for where philosophy currently is (no offense to undergraduates).

    However, when you search under those who specialize in metaethics (this is arguably the most important figure) the statistics become 59.5% in favour of realism compared with 27.3% against. The figure for PhDs whose AOS is metaethics is 57.2% in favour with 27.8% against. For graduates of philosophy the figure rises to 64.7% in favour with only 24.1% against (clearly people who have graduated in philosophy are more influential in such a survey than those who have not even passed their exams yet?).

    The most important figures see a difference of nearly 10% on what you were citing. When a figure is more than twice as large as another we don’t tend to call it “barely” greater (unless you’re dealing in very small figures). That would not be regarded as a small difference. It’s quite a major one especially when you consider that it was the late 19th and 20th centuries when moral realism was falling heavily out of favour. This indicates a massive swing back to realism and the historical context makes a difference too.

    In my evidence of this view I also cited professional philosophers (John Cottingham and Andrew Fisher) who are making this observation and their comments are made in very recent publications (2009 and 2011 respectively).

    On that basis I do not think I am overstating the matter at all but thank you for your post nonetheless.

    • A restriction to PhDs who study metaethics is significant enough to be mentioned in the text – as it is, it sounds like you’re using all AOS in philpapers.

      • michaelstheology says:

        I still don’t think you have any substantial point here Tarn. I deliberately qualified the term ‘philosopher’ (which is ambiguous of course) with ‘academic’ which does suggest we are talking about graduate level and upwards at the very least. And it is still true to the survey that among academic philosophers moral realism is by far the most agreed metaethical position.

      • I wouldn’t call a position which barely has 50% among philosophers in general “by far the most agreed upon” position (with all AOS, graduate students+PhD and faculty gives ~54% agree or lean towards, with ~52% if you include non-target).

        Where you got “for graduates of philosophy the figure rises to 64.7%”, it’s actually for *graduate students only* whose AOS is meta-ethics, btw

  3. Ben Crandall says:

    A couple of points regarding the Philosophy Survey.

    Although it does seem plausible on its face to assume those who teach and specialize in meta-ethics would have the greatest expertise in the subject and provide the most educated evaluation of the topic, it is also plausible to suggest a selection bias could be involved, as it is not terribly surprising that people tend not to specialize in topics of whose central subjective they believe to be non-existent or largely an arbitrary or subjective subject. For instance I don’t many find it a considerable surprise that a much higher percentage of theists can be found in philosophy of religion departments.

    Even setting that aside, it does not strike me as terribly impressive that slightly less than 6 out of 10 specialists in meta-ethics accept or lean towards moral realism, or under the best figure presented, more than 6 out of 10 graduates accept or lean towards realism.

    Now I only point this out to suggest one cannot take moral realism for granted (not that you were), let alone assume all realists will agree on the fundemental status of realism even if accepted.

  4. michaelstheology says:

    To Ben and Tarn,

    Of course that would normally be the case when the remainder of the 100% are in some other default position but that’s not the case here. For example, ~10% said the question was too unclear to answer (typical philosophers!) so that already leaves ~90% before other considerations. Only ~28% of PhDs who specialize in metaethics are willing to say they either lean toward or embrace non-realism. Now of course that does not mean there are ~72% who are, or lean toward, realism necessarily but it does mean 72% do not even lean toward non-realism in favour of something else.

    The term ‘landslide’ is certainly not set in stone or agreed but plenty of people would consider a 15% difference in votes to be a political landslide. But in this case we have a (using the PhD figures) ~30% difference! A double landslide! A 30% difference in a political vote would be seen as a slaughter.

    Also what you have failed to address is how this is a significant swing in thinking since many philosophers have noted how unpopular realism was in the last 150 years compared to today. That context also suggests the trend is moving in the favour of realism.

    In his ‘Ethics: A contemporary Introduction’ Harry Gensler states: “Not many philosophers today hold subjectivism.” I don’t think he’s wrong to say that and I’m certainly not wrong to say that moral realism is “far” more popular.

    I think I’ve said everything I want to on this matter now. Clearly you don’t agree but I have given plenty of reasons for using the language I did and I stand by it as representing the situation accurately.

    PS. I thought the ‘graduate’ category included everyone at graduate level and above but apparently it does not (looking at the numbers) so that much is true but this group are still, statistically, more important than undergraduates or whoever else might count as a ‘respondent’ so I don’t put as much stock in the ‘all respondents’ category I’m afraid (whilst I completely understand why that statistic would be favoured by non-realists when quoting the survey – wink wink!).

  5. Simone says:

    I look forward to your post on moral realism.

  6. Pingback: Daring to disagree with Plantinga and Pigliucci | aRemonstrant'sRamblings

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  8. Gary M says:

    The views of modern society regarding religion, and specifically Christianity, are in a state of great flux. Beliefs that were once sacrosanct are now being called into question. Is the day soon coming when the majority of people in society will view “the Holy Bible” as immoral and evil?

    Imagine if your grade schooler brings home a few books from the school library with these titles:

    1. Giving the Death Sentence to People who eat Forbidden Fruit

    2. Drowning Millions of Children for the Crimes of their Parents

    3. How to Murder First Born Children in their Beds

    4. The Genocidal Annihilation of Evil Foreign Peoples is Justifiable

    You would be horrified that your local school would allow such books in a library for children, wouldn’t you? But yet fundamentalist Christians would love to have the Holy Bible in the same library and would not bat an eye at the bloody, barbaric violence and twisted justifications for that violence and immoral behavior contained therein.

    “Oh but that was in another Era of time. It is a mystery why it was necessary for God to do these shocking acts, but we must simply accept by faith that God had good, moral reasons for his actions in the Old Testament.”

    Ok…so we will sweep all that barbaric behavior under the rug because Jesus has changed everything. All that bloody violence is no longer necessary because Jesus has ushered in the Era of Grace. We now are to love our neighbor as ourselves…not slaughter him in righteous anger.

    But there is one little problem: Slavery.

    I don’t see how putting shackles around the neck, ankles, and wrists of your neighbor and calling him your property is in any way, shape, or form “loving your neighbor as yourself”. And I also don’t see why a loving, just, Jesus would not have condemned this evil institution, which he did not, nor why the Apostle Paul would condone it, which he very much did.

    Any book that condones slavery is evil and should not be in any school library…nor on your child’s nightstand.

    • aRemonstrant'sRamblings says:

      Thanks for your comment.

      I admire your wish to keep children protected from very difficult and disturbing moral issues. At the same time there comes a point where they have to be introduced to them. I am not sure what age you are referring to when you say “grade schooler” since we don’t use that term here in the UK. But since I do work in education I happen to know when some pretty tricky moral subjects do begin to be taught to young people. It would be common for children to be taught about the holocaust by the age of 13-14. It would also be common for children to be made aware that there are some people who thought the holocaust was a good thing by the time they are 14-15.

      I am of the opinion that this is a good thing. I think that getting young people to interact with such diverse opinions is healthy and beneficial and it would appear the government in the UK agrees.

      I am not sure what you are proposing? Perhaps you would like your children to be indoctrinated so they only ever hear your point of view on moral matters? I don’t know but for me I think it’s a good thing.

      If you are talking about a much younger child bringing such books home then, of course, that would be inappropriate for them at that age. But then, so would the vast majority of popular children’s stories written in the past one hundred years! This is, however, merely an emotional argument asking me how I feel. I don’t let my ten year old watch the six o’clock news because it’s often about rape these days. In the same way I would not recommend he reads certain stories in the Old Testament until he is older as well.

      But I’m not sure any of this gets to the crux of your complaint. I think your biggest issue is something you only allude to in your comment. I think your biggest problem is with what you perceive certain Old Testament ethical standards to be. You confidently assert that the Old Testament was in favour of a type of possession of slaves which treated them as property. The only problem is that I think that is projecting modern notions of slavery back into the text. I think if books like Deuteronomy are studied more carefully, as a good many scholars have argued, such notions are not actually there. The only problem is most people are not prepared to invest the necessary study but instead watch videos by Dawkins and Harris who are not Old Testament scholars and who never interact with Old Testament scholarship in any serious way. For myself I prefer to read the scholarship rather than have a popular level speaker lecture me about a subject they really know very little about. (You may read that as an insult aimed at Dawkins and Harris because it most certainly is!)

      I have neither the time nor the inclination to refute that entire ten minute speech by Harris but I think it’s from his debate with Craig which, in my opinion, he soundly lost. In that short speech Harris shows his confusion on many issues to do with philosophy of religion. He confuses the logical and evidential arguments from suffering (conflating them as one argument), he misrepresents and stereotypes Hinduism, he shows no understanding of Old Testament case law, and he misrepresents divine command theory (which is a very well regarded theory of morality in metaethics today among scholars). Is Harris trying to prove to me that he’s never actually studied any of these issues he’s raising? If so he did a darn fine job. I know of some 16 year olds who know more about philosophy of religion than Mr Harris.

      You finished by saying:

      Any book that condones slavery is evil and should not be in any school library…nor on your child’s nightstand.

      I think “slavery” needs so defining here but I would broadly agree with you. Which is why I am glad the Bible is both in my school (in fact in every school in this country) and on my child’s nightstand.

      I have written more on this topic here:

      Thanks again.

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