When ‘Street Epistemology’ met a real epistemologist


1907631_733047390101016_4612179800882097951_nI would love to write an extensive commentary on the discussion between Tim McGrew and Peter Boghossian but, for reasons I explained the other day, I’m unable to do so right now. Whether there’s even a need for me to do so is questionable since some very good responses have already appeared on the internet. So here are some links to some I think are worth reading.

You can find the discussion here:


Randal Rauser has a reflection on the debate which can be found here Tim McGrew gives Peter Boghossian an unbelievable public drubbing.

I think it would be pretty difficult to disagree with Rauser on the issue of whether Boghossian qualifies as a bigot or not.

Wintery Knight has an overview of the conversation and a poll where you can express your opinion on what you mean by the word faith: Tim McGrew debates Peter “Bogo the Clown” Boghossian on the definition of faith

Nick Peters has responded over at ‘Deeper Waters’ Tim McGrew vs. Peter Boghossian.

J.W. Wartick has written a piece on his blog “Is Faith a False Epistemology?”- Debate Review: Tim McGrew vs. Peter Boghossian.

There are a few comments over at THINKAPOLOGETICS.COM Unbelievable : Peter Boghossian vs Tim McGrew – Debate on ‘A Manual For Creating Atheists”

Graham Veale has a piece over at Saints and Sceptics: Faith: Simple Lessons for New Atheists.

Those are the main ones as far as I can see.

Personally I cannot understand how any rational person could think that Street Epistemology is a valid or useful approach to the ongoing dialogue between theists and atheists after that discussion.

Boghossian’s entire argument in summary:

Okay so Christians don’t agree with my first definition of faith? Here’s a second. Oh, they don’t agree with my second definition of faith? Here’s a third. Oh, the third one is a bit ambiguous and seems to be closer to the orthodox usage of the word? Well let’s go with that then. Let’s see if Christians agree with that definition and if they do I’ll twist it so they’re conceding something they’re really not!


At the end of the show Boghossian asked if the “vast majority” of Christians use the word faith the way he uses it (after three revisions). Here are the results from the Unbelievable poll:

ScreenHunter_369 May. 26 08.49

I guess the question now is whether Boghossian is doxastically open enough to permit the empirical evidence to change his mind or whether he will continue to believe something in the face of evidence to the contrary.

Of course Boghossian finished by trying to get the poll to be aligned to his THIRD definition of faith and not either of the two in his book.

Notice this statement in his finishing comments:

“I think anybody who sincerely listened to this conversation knows exactly that I’m correct and that this is how the overwhelming majority of people have it.”

Boghossian has already given himself a way out of ignoring the empirical evidence. He will write off everyone who doesn’t agree with him with an ad hominem. How can someone who teaches critical thinking be engaging in such tactics?

Today the Christian philosopher Guillaume Bignon tweeted this:

“That a proposition’s being possibly false is compatible with its being very probably true is lost on too many debaters.”

I certainly think Peter Boghossian misses that point and dozens of others as well.

Happy reading and I hope to see you again in a couple of months!

More on Tim McGrew:

Professional publications

Interviews and teaching materials

Tim McGrew’s Recommended Apologetics Reading

Here is an extremely good historical survey of the word faith by Wessel:

How Do You Define “Faith”?

PS. Did you spot Boghossian’s attempt to poison the well at the beginning of the discussion with McGrew? If not, here’s him doing it again in retrospect on Twitter:

ScreenHunter_377 May. 27 10.40

222 retweets for that! Critical thinking is still unpopular! No doubt my response will go unanswered! Boghossian probably has some private, non-standard, definition of ‘theologian’ that he’s using here anyway.

ScreenHunter_378 May. 27 10.43

Next time you see one of these at a Boghossian lecture, you might want to ask for a definition before you sit down!

1e98e89455c2abe7fe97d74e9ec76f6d_viewSorry for all the memes but, could this be the future of ‘Street Epistemology’?



This is an interesting piece I only just spotted on what it’s like to have private email correspondence with Peter Boghossian:

Peter Boghossian sees through me

Posted in Atheism, Atheist apologists, Epistemology, Faith, New Atheism, Philosophy, Street Epistemology | Tagged , | 11 Comments

Peter Boghossian and Tim McGrew in discussion this weekend!

ScreenHunter_367 May. 21 03.13


I don’t want to tell you what to do but… don’t miss it!

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Many thanks!

I just want to explain why I won’t be blogging for at least a couple of months.

I have had some serious health issues over the last six months or so and I must go for a rather serious operation on my brain (I know – they found one! and when is an operation on the brain ever not serious?). The chances of success are good but, even so, I have other things and people I need to spend my time on/with in the next few weeks.

If you have been a reader or contributor to my blog in any way whatsoever I just want to say a huge thank you and wish you all the best. I hope to see you again in a couple of months.

This song has been very precious to me and continues to be. Not because it’s wishful thinking but because it’s true. You probably know it already but if not here it is:

God bless.

Posted in Uncategorized | 12 Comments

The beauty of penal substitutionary atonement

“…where the idea of the wrath of God is ignored, there also will there be no understanding of the central conception of the Gospel: the uniqueness of the revelation in the Mediator.”

Emil Brunner The Mediator p.152

I had not intended to write anything about Easter (which is why I’m horribly late to the party!) but as I read and reflected on this significant part of the year I became increasingly aware of how fashionable it is becoming for modern Christians to have a go at penal substitutionary atonement (from now on PSA).

I was reminded of the debate between evangelicals and progressives by watching the discussion between Andrew Wilson and Steve Chalke on ‘Unbelievable’ a few weeks ago and since have found numerous Christian bloggers defending Chalke’s view. I was finally compelled to write something after hearing one Christian blogger declare:

What saves us is not that Jesus died for us.”

Jim McDermott Why Good Friday is too often like a bad Indiana Jones movie (April 2014)

Now of course not all who disagree with PSA are willing to go that far in their language but there is certainly one particular meaning of that phrase they are rejecting.

[I apologize in advance because this is going to be a long post. This represents at least five years of wanting to say something on this subject and if it’s too much for one sitting that’s fine. It took me about twenty sittings to write it. I do hope that you will read it to the end though – especially if you disagree with me! I am not claiming to say anything new but rather to explain why PSA is often misrepresented. There are clearly some serious problems, for those who take a high view of Scripture at least, if PSA is dropped in terms of explaining many biblical passages and the doctrine of the justice of God but I will have to save those problems for another time.]

I don’t know about you but when I read a modern Christian disagreeing with PSA I always end up feeling they don’t really understand the doctrine they are disagreeing with.

A classic example of this would be Steve Chalke:

“How then, have we come to believe that at the cross this God of love suddenly decides to vent his anger and wrath on his own Son? The fact is that the cross isn’t a form of cosmic child abuse – a vengeful Father, punishing his Son for an offense he has not even committed.”

Steve Chalke and Alan Mann The Lost Message of Jesus (2003) p.182

Here are the complaints from self-proclaimed ‘post-evangelical’ Dave Tomlinson:

“…the cross did not bring about forgiveness – this existed already; but rather, Jesus enacted and represented the forgiveness which has always been there in the heart of God. His attitude does not change toward us; instead our attitude towards him changes as we see forgiveness acted out before us.”

No wonder just a few sentences later he asks:

“Does it [that is to say his reading of the theology of the cross] exalt love at the cost of righteousness?”

Dave Tomlinson The Post-Evangelical 1995 p.100,1

Or more recently by Brian Zahnd:

The Bible is clear, God did not kill Jesus. Jesus was offered as a sacrifice in that the Father was willing to send his Son into our sinful system in order to expose it as utterly sinful and provide us with another way. The death of Jesus was a sacrifice in that sense. But it was not a sacrifice to appease a wrathful deity or to provide payment for a penultimate god subordinate to Justice.”

How does “Dying for our sins” work? (April 2014) [Emphasis authors.]

Yet all these sentiments are a far cry from the doctrine expressed within evangelical scholarship. What Chalke, Tomlinson and Zahnd all have in common is that they appear to misconceive how PSA is expressed by those who hold to it, they fail to engage with the scholars they are disagreeing with, and they also completely ignore the passages in the Bible which have traditionally been taken to be teaching it. Obviously, I’m not the first person to notice this. In a classic treatment on the subject Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach complain:

9781433501081“…the most pressing reason why this book is necessary is that the misconceived criticisms of penal substitution show no sign of abating, and the resulting confusion within the Christian community seems to be increasing rather than decreasing. As Carl Trueman remarked, ‘The classical evangelical position on atonement has fallen out of favour over recent years, often rejected on the basis of a theologically caricatured and historically inadequate understanding of what exactly the position entails.'”

Steve Jeffery, Mike Ovey, Andrew Sach Pierced for our Transgressions: Rediscovering the glory of penal substitution (2007) p.31

In this post I wish to clarify what PSA is generally considered to be by those who hold to it and to dispel a few modern myths about it. I am under no illusion that I will be able to convince a progressive Christian to believe it but I think that is because of a deeper issue which separates us and that is the question of what gets to be the final arbiter of Christian doctrine.

You will notice that the theologians I am most influenced by on this matter are John Stott and Leon Morris. If you are a Christian who takes the authority of the Bible seriously and yet you completely disagree that the Bible teaches PSA I would highly recommending both of them. My piece also relies heavily on the book by Jeffery, Ovey and Sach who, I think, have compiled a fantastic summary of the doctrine in their book just referenced.

What is PSA?

“The doctrine of penal substitution states that God gave himself in the person of his Son to suffer instead of us the death, punishment and curse due to fallen humanity as the penalty for sin.”

Steve Jeffery, Mike Ovey, Andrew Sach Pierced for our Transgressions: Rediscovering the glory of penal substitution (2007) p.21

At first glance that might appear to be saying what the progressives cited above are criticizing but I think a deeper look at the doctrine reveals how misunderstood it is. It does not hold that God suddenly reacted in an emotive fashion to our sins (as expressed by Chalke). It is quite obviously not a form of child abuse. As I will point out in the next section, this is to completely misunderstand how the doctrine of the Trinity relates to the doctrine of PSA. It is also not suggesting that there is some higher standard of justice which God is himself answerable to (as expressed by Zahnd).

God the Father (and the ‘pagan’ comparison myth)

One thing I find to be so profoundly annoying among those who argue against substitutionary atonement is that they so frequently get the role of God the Father wrong in their criticisms. In their parodies the Father is either inactive in salvation or he is merely angry (in the sense of being in some emotional state) and Jesus manages to appease his feelings of anger almost against his will. [1] Some even make him seem like he reluctantly participates in the plan of salvation. But this is a seriously deficient view of the doctrine.

As Leon Morris notes:

“The atonement is not basically an impersonal affair nor a sole concern of the Son. It is rather something in which the persons of both the Father and the Son are exceedingly active. It is not an affair in which Christ takes a firm initiative while the Father adopts a passive role. In every part of the New Testament that we have so far examined the fact that the atonement proceeds from the loving heart of God has been emphasized.”

Leon Morris The Cross in the New Testament (1976) p.220,1

The point is also made by Ladd:

“Clearly, atonement is not an affair in which Christ takes the initiative while the Father adopts a passive role. Paul does not differentiate between the love of God and of Christ. Both are seen in the cross. Indeed, the love of Christ is the love of God, and vise versa.”

George Eldon Ladd A Theology of the New Testament (Revised 1994 Edition) p.465

And again:

“The idea that the cross expresses the love of Christ for us while he wrings atonement from a stern and unwilling Father, perfectly just, but perfectly inflexible, is a perversion of New Testament theology.”

George Eldon Ladd A Theology of the New Testament (Revised 1994 Edition) p.465,6

Guthrie makes it clear how this is far removed from pagan notions of appeasement:

“What Christ did was a substitutionary act by which God shows that his anger is turned away, so that men are now freed to come into a relationship with him. This is very different from the appeasement idea, in which the worshipper was obliged to adhere to certain rituals to persuade the god to change his attitude. In Christian thought it is God himself who takes the initiative.”

Donald Guthrie New Testament Theology (1981) p.470

So too, Carson:

“This marks the fundamental difference between pagan propitiation and Christian propitiation. In pagan propitiation, a human being offers a propitiatory sacrifice to make a god propitious. In Christian propitiation, God the Father sets forth Jesus as the propitiation to make himself propitious; God is both the subject and the object of propitiation. God is the one who provides the sacrifice precisely as a way of turning aside his own wrath. God the Father is thus the propitiator and the propitiated, and God the Son is the propitiation.”

Don Carson Scandalous p.64,5 (Emphasis authors.)

This approach is far more in line with the orthodox doctrine of the trinity as he explains:

“God presenting Christ as a propitiatory sacrifice is not an instance of “cosmic child abuse” in which God beats up on his kid… God demonstrates his love in that Christ died for us. You must not think that God stands over against us while Christ stands for us, as if Father and Son are somehow at odds, so that the Father takes it out on his Son. God desmonstrates his love by sending Christ. This is bound up with the very nature and mystery of the incarnation and the Trinity. This is the triune God’s plan. It hurts the Father to lose his Son, but he does it because he loves us.”

Don Carson Scandalous p.69 (Emphasis authors.)

Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach have a good passage on this too:

“From a historical point of view, it is important to recognize that the Old Testament rituals that form much of the biblical background to the New Testament teaching about Christ’s sacrificial death were radically different from many of the pagan practices of other ancient Near Eastern peoples. God’s people received detailed, lengthy descriptions of precisely how to conduct their sacrifices (see especially Lev.1-7; also Exod.29-30; Num.15,28-29), and were explicitly forbidden from imitating many of the rituals of other nations (eg. Deut.12:4,31; 18:19; Lev.18; 2 Kings 17:15-17; 21:2; 2 Chr. 33:2), particularly the appalling practice of child sacrifice (Deut. 12:31; 2Kgs 17:17; 2 Chr. 28:3; 33:6; Jer. 7:31; 19:5, Ezek. 20:31). The mere fact that the other nations also performed sacrifices should therefore not be allowed to obscure the huge differences between those practices and the Old Testament sacrificial system.”

Steve Jeffery, Mike Ovey, Andrew Sach Pierced for our Transgressions: Rediscovering the glory of penal substitution (2007) p.227,8

John Stott notes two very key differences between pagan notions of substitution and the Christian doctrine:

1. God’s wrath is not volatile or erratic (contrary to the supposed comparison by Chalke and Mann).

2. The propitiation is not made by us but by God himself.

This makes the idea of propitiation completely different in Christian theology to ideas found in pagan practices.

Contrast all of that with what Brian Zahnd claims:

“Particularly abhorrent are those theories that portray the Father of Jesus as a pagan deity who can only be placated by the barbarism of child sacrifice. The god who is mollified by throwing a virgin into a volcano or by nailing his son to a tree is not the Abba of Jesus!”

[See previous link.]

Notice how Zahnd tries to poison the well by already asserting that the Christian doctrine is akin to the pagan practice. Then he, falsely, uses a comparison with child sacrifice which is repeatedly outlawed in the Old Testament. I suppose Zahnd, Chalke, Mann, and others like this comparison because it works on an emotive level. Who in their right mind will agree with child sacrifice? But this is to falsely conflate the meaning of the word ‘child’ with the word ‘son’. Adults can be sons. In fact, all historical scholars agree that Jesus was an adult at the time of his crucifixion and therefore the idea that one has a direct comparison with ‘child sacrifice’ here is absurd.

It also misunderstands the doctrine of the Trinity. Those who think that holding to substitutionary atonement commits one to two different types of God (one found in the Father and the other in the Son) are making a false accusation. Those who hold to the doctrine of PSA have a very strong doctrine of the unity of the triune God working his purposes of redemption through the Son. The triune God is the instigator of the plan of atonement, the triune God is active in the atonement, and the triune God’s expression of love for humankind is found in the punishment all three of them suffer in the divine separation which takes place on the cross. The Son was not only separated from the Father but the Father was also separated from the Son. We ought not forget that.

God the Son

Another serious deficiency among critics of PSA is the role of the Son. It’s common for detractors to claim this understanding of the cross indicates some abuse toward the Son and yet this criticism monumentally fails to take into account the participation of the Son in the plan of atonement for sin.

In commenting on the beginning of Isaiah 53 Jeffery, Ovey and Sach state:

“The Servant consented to, and actively participated in, this ministry of sin-bearing and substitutionary death, in accordance with the will of God to afflict him in the place of others. Isaiah carefully guards against the false idea that God inflicted punishment against the Servant’s will; indeed, ‘God’s responsibility for the Servant’s vicarious role is articulated explicitly after the Servant’s acceptance of suffering has been established in 53:4a.’… If we step back for a moment and reflect on the way that this text speaks of the ministry of Christ, then we find in this solidarity of purpose a wonderful testimony to the unity of Father and Son within the Trinity.”

Steve Jeffery, Mike Ovey, Andrew Sach Pierced for our Transgressions: Rediscovering the glory of penal substitution (2007) p.59

Those who claim that PSA suggests that God the Father is being unfair on God the Son appear to fail to notice that this charge can be leveled at them as well and perhaps even more so. Let us suppose that the cross is only about God demonstrating the extent of his love for us. We could criticize this idea in the same way PSA is criticized. Only, in this case, there is no objective reason for the Son to die. There is no need for it. Surely God could have demonstrated his love in many other ways? Why did the Son have to die? And even if you can find a reason for Jesus needing to die, why then was a separation between God the Father and God the Son necessary? Why does that take place? Once you reject PSA from your understanding of the cross there really is no substantial reason for Jesus to die and it makes his death seem a rather unnecessary gesture and his separation from the Father appears to be unnecessary suffering (ironically thereby making the Godhead look rather abusive). The very criticism leveled at PSA applies to an even greater extent once you reject PSA and I find critics of PSA completely fail to notice this.

In the context of addressing the view that the primary message of the cross is God’s love John Stott writes:

“The cross is the epitome of Christ’s love and the inspiration of ours. But the question we desire to press is this: just how does the cross display and demonstrate Christ’s love? What is there in the cross which reveals love? True love is purposive in its self-giving; it does not make random or reckless gestures. If you were to jump off the end of a pier and drown, or dash into a burning building and be burnt to death, and if your self-sacrifice had no saving purpose, you would convince me of your folly, not your love. But if I were myself drowning in the sea, or trapped in the burning building, and it was in attempting to rescue me that you lost your life, then I would indeed see love not folly in your action. Just so the death of Jesus on the cross cannot be seen as a demonstration of love in itself, but only if he gave his life in order to rescue ours.”

John Stott The Cross of Christ (1986) p.220

In the context of atheists asking about the moral fairness of the sacrifice of the Son in some legal sense as being morally appropriate Alvin Plantinga points out:

“If God considers human beings guilty because of the sins they commit, then human beings are indeed guilty. If God approves, as no doubt he does, of his accepting the sacrifice of his son on the cross as a propitiation for human sin, then that arrangement is morally impeccable. If God is willing to accept the death of Jesus Christ, the second person of the Trinity, as restoring the moral balance, then indeed the death of the second person of the Trinity restores the moral balance.”

Alvin Plantinga Comments on ‘Satanic Verses: Moral Chaos in Holy Writ’ (in Divine Evil? The Moral Character of the God of Abraham edited by Bergmann, Murray, and Rea) p.114

Is penal substitutionary atonement something new?

It is unfortunately all too common to hear some critics of PSA suggest it is a doctrine which only extends as far back as the Reformers or, at the very earliest, Anselm of Canterbury (c.1033-1109). Oxford theologian Alister McGrath suggests the origin of this myth can be traced back to a book called Christus Victor by Gustaf Aulen in 1930:

“In a brief and very compressed account of the history of theories of the atonement, Aulen argued that this highly dramatic “classic” theory (Christus Victor) had dominated Christianity until the Middle Ages, when more abstract legal theories began to gain ground. The situation was reversed through Martin Luther, who reintroduced the theme. However, the scholastic concerns of Protestant orthodoxy led to its being relegated once more to the background. Aulen argued that this approach could no longer be allowed to be the victim of historical circumstances; it demanded a full and proper hearing.

Historically, Aulen’s case was soon found to be wanting. Its claims to be treated as the “classic” theory of the atonement had been overstated. It was indeed an important component of the general patristic understanding of the nature and mode of procurance of salvation; nevertheless, if any theory could justly lay claim to the title of “the classic theory of the atonement,” it would be the notion of redemption through unity with Christ.”

Alister McGrath Historical Theology (1998) p.286,7

Many have already shown how long and illustrious the tradition of penal substitutionary atonement is so I will merely cite sources you could look up to investigate this ridiculous claim. Chapter 5 ‘Surveying the Heritage: the historical pedigree of penal substitution’ from the book Pierced for our Transgressions by Steve Jeffery, Mike Ovey, and Andrew Sach is the thesis you need to refute in order to suggest that PSA is a recent doctrinal development. [2]

Penal substitutionary atonement is usually held alongside other motifs

Those who suggest that PSA ought to be dropped often appear to suggest that there can only be one primary understanding of the cross or they suggest that proponents of PSA hold it to the exclusion of other motifs. This is clearly not the case. Again here are some examples just from what I can find on my bookshelf:

“Of course the idea that Jesus died in the place of sinners, bearing the punishment of God’s wrath due to them on account of their rebellion, is not the only thing the Bible teaches about the crucifixion. We find also, for example, that the cross was the means by which Jesus triumphed over evil powers (Col.2:15), that it offers and inspiring example to those who suffer unjustly (1 Peter 2:21-23), and that it brings about a decisive end to our old life of sin, that we might live as new people (Rom.6:6). The biblical portrayal of the atonement has many facets.”

Steve Jeffery, Mike Ovey, Andrew Sach Pierced for our Transgressions: Rediscovering the glory of penal substitution (2007) p.33

N.T. Wright has said:

“I want all of the theories of Atonement because I think that they all ultimately do fit together, but if you just take one of them, say Penal Substitution, and take it out of its biblical context, the danger then is that you do just have a picture of God as a sort of bullying headmaster who because the rest of the class have been bad he picks on his own son and he beats him up and says, ‘Well that’ll do.’ And I dread to think that there are some Christians who really think that that’s what the story is like.” [3]

Both Stott and Ladd also make it clear there are other motifs:

“…Gustav Aulen was right to draw the church’s attention to the cross as victory, and to show that by his death Jesus saved us not only from sin and guilt, but from death and the devil, in fact all evil powers, as well.”

John Stott The Cross of Christ (1986) p.229

“Full recognition of the propitiatory, substitutionary character of the death of Christ must not permit us to overlook or to underemphasize the companion teaching that the death of Christ as a demonstration of divine love is designed to kindle a loving response in the hearts of human beings.”

George Eldon Ladd A Theology of the New Testament (Revised 1994 Edition) p.473,4

Even Don Carson, who sees PSA as a more important theme than the others, does not deny other models:

“With all due respect to those who insist that penal substitution is just one gospel metaphor of many, propitiation is in fact what holds together all the other biblical ways of talking about the cross.”

Don Carson Scandalous p.67

Christian philosopher John Hare, in the context of talking about understanding Jesus’ death as a sacrifice, notes:

“This is only one of the pictures presented in the New Testament. Colin Gunton stresses that the various pictures are required to supplement each other, and no one of them should be taken in isolation. Nonetheless, he thinks sacrifice is “the very centre of the doctrine of the atonement.” “

John Hare Forgiveness, Justification, and Reconciliation in The Wisdom of the Christian Faith edited by Paul Moser and Michael T. McFall p.87

Those who hold to PSA frequently make it clear that it can, and ought, to be held alongside other understandings which arise when considering what the full understanding of the cross. If there are proponents of PSA out there who hold that PSA is the only way in which the cross can be understood I’ve never read them. Who are they exactly and where do they say it? Until that evidence is provided this appears to be a criticism based on a myth.

Biblical justification for penal substitutionary atonement

When N.T. Wright makes it clear on video (as he has done in his writings also) [4] that he does hold to PSA he suggests the most obvious places to begin finding it in the New Testament are Galatians 3:13; Romans 8:1-4:

“Paul says that God condemned sin in the flesh of Jesus Christ. That is penal because it’s condemnation, it is substitutionary because what happened there in the flesh of Jesus Christ means that therefore there is now no condemnation… Romans 8:1-4 really says it all…”

Wright has felt the need to make it clear since some have suggested that Wright does not hold to PSA. This is a rather stunning misrepresentation since he has made it clear in his writings he does. Wright has said:

“No clearer statement is found in Paul, or indeed anywhere else in all early Christian literature, of the early Christian belief that what happened on the cross was the judicial punishment of sin. Taken in conjunction with [Romans] 8:1 and the whole argument of the passage, not to mention the partial parallels in 2 Cor. 5:21 and Gal. 3:13, it is clear that Paul intends to say that in Jesus’ death the damnation that sin deserved was meted out fully and finally, so that sinners over whose heads that condemnation had hung might be liberated from this threat once and for all.”

N.T. Wright The Letter to the Romans NIB 10:574,5

No wonder then that Michael Bird exclaims:

“How can one read this statement by Wright and then say, as I heard one “theologian” declare on a weekly podcast show, that N.T. Wright does not know “what to do with the cross”? That simply baffles me.”

Michael Bird Evangelical Theology p.406

Hare writes:

“We must be careful, it is true, not to impute to God’s justice what is true only of interhuman affairs, but the idea of separation from God, and so death in various forms, as consequence and punishment for what we do and are against God, is both deeply embedded in Scripture and part of a typical Christian conception of divine justice.”

John Hare Forgiveness, Justification, and Reconciliation in The Wisdom of the Christian Faith edited by Paul Moser and Michael T. McFall p.90,1

The New Testament scholar Leon Morris begins his discussion on this topic by saying:

“Repeatedly Paul says that Christ died for sin and that he died for men. For the first point let us notice that He was ‘delivered up for our trespasses’ (Rom.4:25), that He ‘died for our sins’ (1 Cor.15:3), that He ‘gave himself up for our sins’ (Gal.1:4), that ‘the death that he died, he died unto sin once for all’ (Rom.6:10), that God sent Him ‘in the likeness of sinful flesh and as an offering for sin’ (Rom.8:4).”

Leon Morris The Cross in the New Testament (1976) p.217

“If Jesus allowed himself to be crucified at Passover time subsequently to instituting the eucharist, he inevitably proclaimed in the contemporary culture an understanding of it in this kind. I conclude that the claim of many New Testament books, that Jesus ‘died for our sins’, originated in the teachings of Jesus.”

Richard Swinburne Was Jesus God? p.107

The first third of Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach’s book is an extended look at the biblical justification for finding PSA in the Bible and is such a strong case I would highly recommend it for anyone who doubts. [5]


One of the biggest problems for those rejecting PSA, for those who take the Bible seriously, is what do do with the biblical narrative of salvation. From the fall of Adam and Eve, the covenants God makes with man, the Exodus, the Law, the Tabernacle, the sacrificial system, the judges, the Exile, the Prophets, the teachings of Jesus, and right up to the writings of Paul the problem is what to make of the fact that the Bible portrays God as angry at sin and requiring a punishment for it. For myself, I cannot see how someone can take the Bible seriously and yet attempt to lose the doctrine of PSA.

What I do hope is that critics of PSA will take more time and care to understand the doctrine they are claiming to disagree with. Too often it appears to be the case that they don’t bother and instead attack a straw man their opponents simply do not hold to. I think the genuine doctrine of penal substitutionary atonement is a beautiful doctrine without which one will struggle to make sense of the biblical narrative and the very character of God.

As Alvin Plantinga says, in the context of a propitiatory understanding of the cross:

“This story of atonement is the greatest story ever told, indeed, the greatest story that could be told…”

Alvin Plantinga Comments on ‘Satanic Verses: Moral Chaos in Holy Writ’ (in Divine Evil? The Moral Character of the God of Abraham edited by Bergmann, Murray, and Rea) p.112

“Amazing love! How can it be

That thou, my God, should’st die for me?”

Charles Wesley’s And can it be


[1] Here is Christian theologian Greg Boyd doing just that:

Boyd does not like the idea of there being violence at the centerpiece of God’s plan of redemption. But I don’t see how rejecting penal substitution solves that fact. The violence is still there if you reject PSA but now you have the even bigger problem that Jesus didn’t really need to die for our sins in any legal sense. So now the violence appears to be far more arbitrary and unnecessary. Does God really need to die in that fashion to demonstrate his love for us? Could he not have chosen some other equally valid ways?

Then Boyd attempts to discredit the idea merely because pagans had some primitive intuition about this (and he calls it a “demonic intuition”). But this is merely an attempt to discredit an idea by associating it with some group we would otherwise disagree with in order to attempt to make it less attractive and that is not a sound argument to make. Just because Nazis had an interest in ancient archaeology does not make doing ancient archaeology demonic. This is just mud slinging. Also he cites the example of ancient people’s sacrificing children to the gods to appease them but this is a practice which those who hold to PSA firmly disagree with since Scripture is so clear on it being wrong. The PSA model is not suggesting anyone but God himself can be such a sacrifice for sin.

Boyd is just horribly wrong when he asserts that if the PSA intuition is right then the intuition that children should be sacrificed to the gods is also right. This is just grossly mistaken and highly illogical as an argument. That’s akin to arguing that if I advocate for voluntary organ donations I must therefore advocate involuntary organ removals from unwilling (or unknowing) victims as the logical outworkings of my view on voluntary organ donation. That is, frankly, an absurd inference. I have a lot of time for Boyd but that ‘argument’ was just horrible. I think it’s because he was making a quick rant of a video rather than a carefully considered argument.

[2] Penal Substitution In The Writings Of The Church Fathers

Chapter 5 ‘Surveying the Heritage: the historical pedigree of penal substitution’ of Pierced for our Transgressions by Steve Jeffery, Mike Ovey, and Andrew Sach.

N.T Wright (though not agreeing with everything in the book still) says:

“…it firmly and decisively knocks on the head an old canard which is repeated yet again in a letter in the Church Times (20 April 2007, p. 13): that ‘penal substitution’ was invented by Anselm and developed by Calvin, and that it excludes and even contradicts other ideas, not least the ‘Christus Victor’ theme. Over against this, J, O and S offer a catena of passages from Justin Martyr, Eusebius of Caesarea, Hilary of Poitiers, Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzus, Ambrose, Augustine, Cyril of Alexandria, Gelasius of Cyzicus, Gregory the Great, and Thomas Aquinas.”

The Christian philosopher John Hare also makes note of this in his paper Forgiveness, Justification, and Reconciliation (in The Wisdom of the Christian Faith ed. Moser and McFall) pp.77-96.

See also: Stott’s The Cross of Christ Chapter 5 ‘Satisfaction for sin’.


[4] See: N.T. Wright on Penal Substitution and The Cross and the Caricatures by Tom Wright.

Philosopher Richard Swinburne on the need for objectivity in theories of the atonement:

[5] They begin in the Old Testament with an extended look at the meaning of the passover, the Day of Atonement, and the sacrificial system of Leviticus. A strong case is made for the Hebrew term kipper taking the meaning of ‘averting God’s wrath’ in many places (eg. Numbers 16 and 25). They then proceed to find the concept in the Psalms and the Prophets. They offer a substantial interaction with the Servant Songs in Isaiah and offer critical replies to those who have attempted to claim that PSA cannot be found in Isaiah. They also explain the New Testament use of Isaiah and how it is applied to Jesus. They then turn their focus to the gospels and make a specific study of Mark and John. They then address the writings of Paul and Peter.

This Old Testament background understanding of propitiation for sins is crucial for understanding this doctrine.

Old Testament scholar, Willem VanGemeren notes:

“The death of Christ is a part of the gospel message. Jesus ‘died for our sins’ in fulfillment of the Old Testament sacrifices and priestly system (Rom. 3:24-26;8:3). His death satisfied the wrath of God, evoked by our sinful condition (Rom. 5:9). The death of the Christ was thus victorious; he died for us rather than for himself (Gal. 3:13; Eph. 5:2; 1 Thess. 5:10; Heb. 9:11-10:18). The death of Christ was foreshadowed by the expiatory offerings in the Old Testament (the sin and guilt offering) and is efficacious for salvation and sanctification (13:10-13).

Jesus fully identified with the human condition in his incarnation in that he took God’s judgement of sinners on himself (Gal. 3:13). In his death for others he, as the last Adam, represented the human family so that he in his life might bring the benefits of his substitutionary death to all who are in him (Rom. 5:12-6:14).

The effect of Christ’s sacrifice is nothing less than what God had promised to his Old Testament people: covering of the sin, forgiveness, and cleansing. In the Old Testament the priestly system, the regulations of holiness and purity, and the sacrificial system foreshadowed the death of the Christ. The Old Testament people of God truly experienced forgiveness, cleansing, and the joy of their salvation because the wrath of God was propitiated in anticipation of the final work of our Lord.”

 Willem VanGemeren The Progress of Redemption: From Creation to the New Jerusalem (1988) p.405



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Getting the arguments for God wrong

It’s pretty hard to find too many professional philosophers who mock the traditional arguments for the existence of God even when they disagree with them. I would suggest part of the reason for this is because they, very often, know there are various forms of these arguments and they are aware of responses theists have offered to possible criticisms. Having said that there are some atheist philosophers who have not done sufficient homework in philosophy of religion and yet attempt to interact with the arguments while getting them wrong.

What I intend to compile here are a few misrepresentations of arguments for the existence of God that exist in modern atheistic literature. Since many atheists themselves now consider Dawkins and other New Atheists to be an easy target (and admit they get the arguments wrong quite openly) I will therefore restrict myself to professional philosophers who are atheists since most of them tend to avoid New Atheism. Having said that I am going to begin with the one glaring anomaly to that generalization.

(I’m going to keep adding examples as I find them so if you know of any not documented here please let me know and, if I agree it’s a misrepresentation, I will add it.)


1. Daniel Dennett‘s Breaking the Spell:

Dennett only manages six pages on arguments for the existence of God in a book which is over four-hundred pages long in total. Brevity is okay if you can manage to explain complex arguments succinctly. Unfortunately Dennett cannot when it comes to philosophy of religion.

On the cosmological argument he says:

“The Cosmological Argument, which in its simplest form states that since everything must have a cause the universe must have a cause – namely, God – doesn’t stay simple for long.”

Students doing philosophy of religion at A-level standard (pre-undergraduate degree standard in the UK) might be excused for such a poor rendering of the argument but, even then, they’re not going to score too highly either! Of course, if any theist had argued that “everything” must have a cause they would be arguing against the existence of God! Fortunately for theism and unfortunately for Dennett, theists have not used this argument.

Notice this interesting caveat at the end of his, less than half a page, critique:

“Unless you have a taste for mathematics and theoretical physics on the one hand, or the niceties of scholastic logic on the other, you are not apt to find any of this compelling, or even fathomable.”

Daniel Dennett Breaking the Spell p.242 [1]

I don’t understand it therefore it’s wrong! Well, it almost sounds like it.

Dennett avoids directly misrepresenting the ontological argument but his treatment goes no further than pointing to Gaunilo’s objection (although modified from an island to an ice-cream sundae) but, of course, he does not mention any of the many responses made to Gaunilo’s objection. The most famous modern philosopher who has contended for the veracity of the ontological argument (Alvin Plantinga) is, not surprisingly, completely ignored. [2]

00097aec_medium2. Robin Le Poidevin‘s Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion

Le Poidevin begins his discussion on the cosmological argument like this:

“In this chapter we shall look at three versions of the cosmological argument. The first I shall call the basic cosmological argument, because the other two are modifications of it. It goes as follows:

The basic cosmological argument

1. Anything that exists has a cause of its existence.

2. Nothing can be the cause of its own existence.

3. The universe exists.

Therefore: The universe has a cause of its existence which lies outside the universe.”

Le Poidevin then immediately admits this:

“Although no-one has defended a cosmological argument of precisely this form, it provides a useful stepping-stone to the other, more sophisticated, versions.”

Le Poidevin Arguing for Atheism p.4

Although Le Poidevin goes on to discuss, what he calls, the temporal cosmological argument (similar to the Kalam but not quite the same) and the modal cosmological argument it’s most curious he begins with a form of the argument which, as he admits, no theist has ever defended. It’s also very disappointing that he does not explore the most discussed form of the argument in modern times (the Kalam) and yet he gives a page of discussion to a form of the argument no theist has ever defended. Odd to say the least.

The God Argument3. Anthony Grayling‘s The God Argument:

Even though Massimo Pigliucci considers the British Humanist philosopher Anthony Grayling to be outside of the New Atheist movement, it certainly appears he shares their zeal for getting theistic arguments horribly wrong. Grayling is a top level philosopher who sits on the editorial boards for numerous philosophical journals and who has lectured in philosophy for many years.

Having said that, listen to him introduce the moral argument (or course – those of you well read in philosophy of religion know there are many versions of this argument):

“What of the moral argument for the existence of a deity? Stated at its simplest, it is that there can be no morality unless there is a deity. Put a little more fully, the argument in effect says that there can be no moral code unless it is laid down, policed, punished and rewarded by a deity… Or, alternatively put again: because god is so nice, we should be nice to each other.”

“The argument that there can be no morality unless policed by a deity is refuted by the existence of good atheists.” [Emphasis mine.] 

Anthony Grayling The God Argument p.103f (kindle ed.)

I didn’t notice it until putting these two quotes side by side but notice how both Dennett and Grayling are keen to talk about the “simplest” versions of the arguments! The only problem is that these ‘simple’ versions are incorrect versions. [3] If I were reading this account of the moral argument for an A-level paper I would conclude the student was, at best, very confused about the argument, and at worst was making it up as they went along. This is, by far, one of the worst accounts of the moral argument I’ve ever read. How can it be that A-level students can understand this argument better than Anthony Grayling? I am yet to work that one out but I think this is a reason why one ought not be worried to hear that some professional philosophers are not impressed by arguments for the existence of God because there is evidence some of them don’t know them very well and/or they cannot describe them correctly.

730484. In her book 36 Arguments for the Existence of God: A Work of Fiction (apt subtitle) philosopher Rebecca Goldstein makes a hash of a good number of the arguments. She proposes a cosmological argument like this:

1. Everything that exists must have a cause.

2. The universe must have a cause (from 1).

3. Nothing can be the cause of itself.

4. The universe cannot be the cause of itself (from 3).

5. Something outside the universe must have caused the universe (from 2 and 4).

6. God is the only thing outside the universe.

7. God caused the universe (from 5 and 6).

8. God exists.

Since I’ve already commented on that first premise when referencing Dennett I’ll let William Lane Craig respond to the rest:

What’s funny is that Goldstein proceeds to point out two “flaws” in this conglomeration of statements masquerading as the cosmological argument. She doesn’t even pause to note that it’s not only logically invalid, but question-begging, since (8) follows from (6) alone, so that all the remaining premisses are just window-dressing. This straw man argument has never been defended by any philosopher in the history of thought.”

William Lane Craig 36 Arguments for the Existence of God: Goldstein on the Cosmological Argument [4]

Given that professional atheist philosophers appear to sometimes be out of their depth doing philosophy of religion in a technically correct fashion it ought not to be surprising that we find these arguments to be horribly wrong in works by atheist authors who have done little or no philosophy at all.

Examples like these suggest that Quentin Smith’s warning to atheist philosophers (that they are not keeping up with technical philosophy of religion well enough to be considered formally competent in the subject) about how well they are able to engage in the subject of philosophy of religion (written some 20 years ago now) has not been given the attention it deserves.


[1] See also this incredibly painful video interview where the Guardian’s religion writer Andrew Brown takes Dennett to the woodshed in just 5 minutes.

[2] See God, Freedom and Evil.

[3] I have more on how poor Grayling’s interaction is with the moral argument in my post Why I like the moral argument for God.

[4] 36 Arguments for the Existence of God: Goldstein on the Cosmological Argument

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‘A Manual for Creating Atheists’ Part 5.4: “What if God told you…?”

At the end of my last post on this book analysis series I commented on Boghossian’s rather bizarre redefinition of the word ‘delusion’ and suggested that his usage of the word, together with his non-standard definition of ‘faith’, cannot possibly be seen as helpful in the context of religious and non-religious people having meaningful conversations.

The rest of chapter 4 (‘Interventions and Strategies’) is really just basic advice on how to have good conversations with people. It ranges from basic commonsense principles most people would already agree with (“express empathy” Loc.1450) right through to the downright patronizing (people who are unwilling to change their views despite a SE ‘intervention’ should be regarded as “precontemplative” Loc.1476 or, in a more honest and less politically correct moment, “denial” Loc.1495). Notice that this is evidence of what William Lane Craig has noticed about Boghossian’s project. He is NOT just attacking people’s ideas – he is also attacking THEM. To claim a person is in denial about something is to attack them as a person as having some personality disorder. It is important to notice this because Boghossian often insists he is not interested in attacking people.


In this post I am going to focus on a conversation Boghossian describes right at the end of the chapter. It is called, “Intervention 2: Kill all left-handed people.”

Boghossian tells a story of how he ended up in a church as he was picking up a friend’s daughter from choir practice and how he targeted a young man in his early twenties while waiting for the practice to finish. After discussing a few other matters Boghossian asks him if God still speaks to people today and the young man affirms his belief that God still does. So Boghossian asks:

“Let’s say that God told you to kill all left-handed people and…”

He gets interrupted as the young man tells him God would not ask him to do that but Boghossian insists that the young man goes with him in his thought experiment. Again he insists that the young man think about a scenario where he became completely and utterly convinced that God had spoken to him and told him to order all left-handed people to be killed and what he would do. Again the young man replies by saying that God would not tell him to do that but Boghossian keeps pressing for a response to this hypothetical scenario by pointing out that God asked Abraham to kill his son in the Old Testament.

Here his Christian interlocutor made a mistake. His mistake was in thinking that God could possibly give this type of command in the part of the Christian narrative we currently find ourselves in. So he tells Boghossian that if he knew for certain that the command came from God then he would do it. (Boghossian then attempts to make the young man feel uncomfortable about admitting this as it conflicts with how he feels about killing people.)

Even if we change the genre of the killing to something more akin to some Old Testament commands (instead of killing left handed people (since that is a bit random) let’s change it to people of some extreme religious view which could undermine Christianity and lead people away from God) that command simply does not fit with where the Christian moral story currently is. [1] There were reasons for the conquests in the Old Testament (the importance of Judah’s line bringing about the Messiah) which simply don’t exist after Jesus has lived and fulfilled his mission. This is why Jesus informs his disciples that the Old Testament law is fulfilled in him. This is why he insists that the time has come in the narrative to love one’s enemies and to pray for those who curse you.

So Boghossian’s question essentially becomes:

“What if God asked you to do something it’s impossible for the God of Christianity to ask you to do?”

The question becomes virtually meaningless [2] and it’s why the young Christian man should have stayed with his initial response to Boghossian instead of getting brow-beaten into answering the question the way he ended up doing.

Any ‘vision’ or ‘experience’ any Christian (or any person for that matter) has which contradicts the moral teachings of Jesus cannot be from God. This is the essence of what it is to be a Christian. Christians believe that God’s fullest expression of what we should do is found in the teachings of Jesus. Therefore, if I had such an experience, I would have to conclude I was deceived.

Toward the end of this intervention the young man asks Boghossian what his point is and he replies:

“I don’t really have a point. I’m just trying to figure out the limits of your faith. It seems to me that your faith is limitless.”

Given everything Boghossian has said about interventions up to this point in his book it’s very hard to believe he is being sincere when he claims he’s not making a point! Notice that as far as he tells us, he did not tell the young man that he was the subject in an intervention. He rather deceives him by making it sound like he’s just thinking on the spot out loud. He finishes by saying to the young man:

“I’m not sure how you or anyone else could ever be certain that God is talking to you. Just because someone is positive that God speaks to them doesn’t mean that God actually spoke to them. They could be mistaken. And just because you feel that Jesus is the Son of God, I’m not sure that you could ever be certain about that either. You could always be mistaken, maybe even delusional. Maybe it’s an idea that’s germinated and developed in you because of our culture and the way our brains work.” [Loc1624]

Notice what Boghossian is up to here. Remember that his aim is to reduce the confidence theists have in the things they believe (again – another thing he does not admit he’s doing to the young man he’s talking to). He considers an intervention successful if a theist who is a 1.5 (on the Dawkins 1-7 scale of belief) reduces their confidence down to a 1.6. But the tool Boghossian is employing to lower the person’s confidence is nothing less than hyperbolic scepticism. This is the ‘going nuclear’ tactic I have complained about before. [3] The reason this is going nuclear is because Boghossian is merely asking if it’s at all possible in the slightest that someone could be wrong on the basis that the brain is not functioning correctly. But this argument could easily be flipped and used on Boghossian in reverse. I could, just as easily, ask Boghossian if his belief in not killing people could possibly be wrong on the basis that it’s merely logically possible that his brain isn’t functioning correctly (or that all human brains function incorrectly systemically). Surely Boghossian would have to confess that it’s possible that the brain (or human brains in general) is not functioning aright (after all, since the problem is in the brain how would he possibly know). But should a sceptical argument like that really be seen as a challenge to the view that I should not kill people? I think it would be difficult to find too many philosophers who would think that’s a particularly strong argument for revising our moral convictions. Notice that it’s not an argument against any specific Christian belief but rather an argument about the possibility of knowing anything at all and therefore applies as much to Boghossian’s moral convictions as any theistic moral conviction. The only difference is that the atheist might just have a harder time suggesting they have good beliefs for thinking the human mind is rational when compared to a theists reasons for thinking it is. [4]

I hope this post helps you think about how you ought to answer a “What if God…” question if you are a Christian. Thanks for continuing with me in ploughing our way through Boghossian’s book. I hope you find some of it useful.



[1] Here is a very good lecture by Christian scholar Peter Williams in which he talks, in part, about what God can and cannot command. This is vitally important if one is going to attempt to internally critique Christian morality and yet Boghossian appears to have missed this very important point.

[2] I say ‘virtually’ since some atheist philosophers (eg. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong) have attempted to create a problem for Christian divine command theory by raising, what Walls and Baggett call, an ‘extended arbitrariness objection’. But since this objection is based on a nonstandard semantics for counterfactuals it looks like a pretty lame argument. For reasons why see ‘Appendix A’ in Good God: The theistic foundations of morality by David Baggett and Jerry Walls.

[3] ‘Going nuclear’ is a term for people who want to doubt something and therefore decide to doubt everything (hence the metaphor). See Boghossian goes nuclear!

[4] See Alvin Plantinga’s Where the Conflict really lies.


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Is Peter Boghossian pretending to know what he does not know?

I have already taken issue with Peter Boghossian’s misuse of the word faith but given some of his recent comments on the Phil Vischer show I think it’s worth showing once more how badly he misunderstands Christianity.

Start by watching @11:42 – 17:20 (the discussion on ‘faith’ goes on to about half an hour into the programme):

Boghossian here attempts to draw a serious semantic divide between the word ‘trust’ and the word ‘faith’ even though most dictionary definitions of ‘faith’ will use the word ‘trust’! Vischer attempts to suggest to Boghossian that he ought to take into account how words are actually being used and Boghossian insists he is.

As evidence for his contention Boghossian suggests that preachers who openly admit they admit that they don’t really believe what they preach are evidence for his definition. But this is just an obvious category error. Just because there exist some people who pretend to be religious when they are not obviously does not mean that all religious people are in that same category. Just because some religious people might use the word ‘faith’ to mean blind faith does not mean that all religious people use the word this way. That is as absurd as suggesting that all atheists are communists because some atheists are communists or that all atheists are affirming the non-existence of God because some atheists affirm the non-existence of God (as opposed to merely defining atheism as a lack of belief in God)!

When Boghossian tries to make a huge difference in meaning between the word faith when applied to a friend and when applied to one’s religious beliefs he is now using the word in a different way than most Christians are using the word and yet, rather than admit that, Boghossian insists that his definition is the one which gets to be right. Boghossian does not cite any Christian philosophers at all in support of his view. [1]

If you listen to the rest of the conversation on the word faith Vischer and Boghossian end up having to agree to disagree on what the word means to them. But this completely supports my contention that Boghossian is setting up a linguistic barrier to serious discussions between atheists and theists by using the word in a different way and attempting to impose that meaning on his opponent.

In other words, half an hour of discussion time is wasted only for Boghossian to have to admit they will have to agree to disagree on the meaning of the word INSTEAD of actually analyzing and discussing what Christians really mean by the word. That is as ridiculous as me insisting that when atheists use the word ‘reason’ what they mean is philosophical rationalism (as in the epistemology after that name) and then demanding that they defend philosophical rationalism for the first half an hour of my discussion with them only then to concede we’re using the word in two different ways.

How Boghossian cannot see this is beyond me!


[1] In his book he attempts to do so and I have shown that he cherry picks and is, unfortunately, guilty of misrepresenting people in doing so here in part 3.1.

Posted in Atheist apologists, Faith, New Atheism | Tagged | 6 Comments

Review of Boghossian’s ‘A Manual for Creating Atheists’ by William Lane Craig

William Lane Craig has given his response to Peter Boghossian’s A Manual for Creating Atheists and some of his comments from online lectures. 


You can listen to it here at Reasonable Faith.

  • Craig firstly takes issue with Boghossian’s contention that ‘faith’ is some kind of epistemology for the Christian. Since Boghossian gets his definition of faith incorrect and falsely suggests his definition is the Christian way of doing epistemology his entire attack is a straw man.

I am pleased to say this is something I have already noted at length. See ‘A Manual for Creating Atheists’ Part 3.1: Faith and ‘A Manual for Creating Atheists’ Part 3.2: Hebrews 11:1.

  • Craig also noted how disingenuous Boghossian is about his intentions. A clip is played of Boghossian saying he does not intend to create atheists but more about creating reliable epistemologies. But then what about the title of his book?!
  • Craig also wishes to ask Boghossian whether a theist can possibly have a rational epistemology. He then lists several top Christian philosophers and asks whether Boghossian would make the claim that they are all epistemologically at fault. This is not answered in Boghossian’s book because Boghossian does not interact with the academic writings of modern theistic philosophers. (At least as far as I have currently got to that has not taken place.) Like the vast majority of the New Atheists, Boghossian has no interest in the slightest in engaging with top-level Christian philosophers. He almost completely ignores their existence and their arguments.

“Now he said there a person can have a faulty epistemology and believe in God or a person can have a faulty epistemology and be an atheist. But will he allow that a person can have a sound epistemology and belief in God? That’s the question. Can you be a critical thinker and believe in God? Or is he really prepared to say that people like Peter van Inwagen, Robert Adams, Alvin Plantinga, and so on and so on, are all irrational? That these men are not critical thinkers? That’s what he is saying, if he thinks that you can’t have a sound epistemology and be a theist.”

  • Craig also complains about how condescending his tone and language is. Does Boghossian think that top level Christian philosophers don’t belong at the ‘adult table’?
  • He also notes that Boghossian does appear to be attacking people rather than ideas. Boghossian does appear to be suggesting that people’s way of knowing is fallacious and that they are not sincere in their beliefs and claims. This is quite damaging to Boghossian’s method because he often claims he is more interested in critiquing ideas rather than attacking people and yet he does appear to do the latter.

It’s well worth a listen and raises some serious problems for Boghossian. The problem is that, at least so far, Boghossian does not appear to be interacting very much with his critics. Perhaps he’s too busy looking for people at his local supermarket to talk to?




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The gobbledygook of John Piper’s Calvinism

In today’s podcast John Piper has responded to the important question: ‘If our will is not free, are we accountable?’

The podcast can be found here (Episode 308).

Piper first suggests that what makes us responsible for our actions is that all people have some knowledge of God (Romans 1) and therefore everyone who has this knowledge has some responsibility for what they do with that knowledge.

Piper suggests that in order to understand the answer to this question we need to understand a distinction made by Jonathan Edwards. He says that Edwards talks about natural and moral inability.


Natural inability is an inability where you cannot do what you most deeply want to do. Piper gives the analogy of a quadriplegic lying on the floor who wants to get up but is physically unable to. This natural inability means someone would not be accountable for their actions.

Moral inability, according to Piper, is where you cannot do other than what you do because what you do is what you most deeply want to do. So now the analogy becomes of a person lying on the floor who wants to lie on the floor and does not wish to get up. This moral inability is something for which people are accountable according to Piper.

Have you noticed the gobbledygook yet?

This supposed distinction (like many other technical distinctions made in scholastic Calvinism) does not even begin to answer the problem. It just pushes the problem back one more step. On Piper’s view of divine determinism God has also determined the characters and the moral inability of people. They do not determine these characteristics for themselves otherwise this would be to give them some moral freedom and Piper will not allow for that. So how can people be accountable for having the desires they have if these desires were causally determined by someone other than the person themselves?

What Piper is basically contending is that the person who desires to continue lying on the floor desires it because someone other than that person injected that person with some chemical which leaves them permanently in a state of desiring to lie on the floor all the time. Piper is insisting that this still leaves the person lying there responsible even though they could not do otherwise because they want to lie there but their desire is primarily caused by an agent outside of themselves. (I am suggesting that the only reason we give Piper’s analogy a hearing is because we get duped into thinking the source of the decision to lie on the floor is the person themselves.)

The question still stands. How can this possibly make someone responsible for rejecting God?

My other question would be why Piper so frequently defers to technical distinctions which don’t solve the problem at all and analogies which are not analogous.


Posted in Calvinism, Free Will, Theology | Tagged , , | 14 Comments

‘A Manual for Creating Atheists’ Part 5.3: Is Boghossian authentic?

Peter-Boghossian-Manual-Creating-AtheistsIn my last piece on Street Epistemology I reiterated why Christians should strongly reject Boghossian’s misunderstanding of the word faith and not allow themselves to have something projected upon them which they simply don’t believe.

I am still in chapter 4 ‘Interventions and Strategies’ and at the subheading ‘Divorce Belief from Morality.’ At this point Boghossian states that it is not virtuous to pretend to know things you don’t know. Since I have already commented on this in my last post I won’t repeat myself here. Suffice to say that Christians, and I suspect most other religious people, would completely agree.

When Boghossian says:

“The belief that faith is a virtue and that one should have faith are primary impediments to disabusing people of their faith.”

Remember that Boghossian himself has asked us to interpret him as saying:

“The belief that pretending to know things you don’t know is a virtue and that one should pretend to know things one doesn’t know are primary impediments to disabusing people of their pretending to know things they don’t know.”

It’s important we don’t equivocate here and think that Boghossian is talking about Christian faith since we have already seen how radically different his usage of the word is. We must take him at his word as meaning the latter translation.

So personally, as a Christian, I have absolutely no problem in the slightest with Boghossian’s view that pretending to know things you don’t know is not a virtue. In fact, Christians would all agree that pretending is not a good or moral thing to do given the importance placed on being honest in a Christian worldview so this should be an area of common ground between Boghossian and Christianity. What is odd is that he does not appear to know enough about Christianity to see this area of common concern. (Of course I’m dying to know how it is, based on his metaethics, he knows there are objective virtues but maybe he will explain that later.)

If this were a dialogue it is at this stage I would like to ask Boghossian whether he thinks misrepresenting people’s beliefs is a virtue.

It certainly seems odd to me that Boghossian does not consider that it’s possible a religious person would agree with him on this matter. He certainly does not offers his SEs any advice on what to do in this eventuality. It is as if Boghossian really thinks that all religious people are, knowingly or unknowingly, pretending. So when Boghossian says “…faith is a failed epistemology” I have no problem with that in the slightest because I know what he means by ‘faith’ and what he means by faith is not what I mean when I use the word ‘faith’.

Boghossian has a little section discussing the relationship between being religious (having ‘faith’) and morality but he really does seem under the illusion that religions teach that once you become religious you will become morally perfect. I don’t think I know of any religions which teach that. You get something close to that in Wesleyanism (the theology of John Wesley) but, even then, they are not arguing for complete moral perfection but rather for a striving toward godly holiness. It’s certainly not taught by the three main monotheistic religions.

So when he gives examples of morally virtuous non-theists and when he instructs his SEs to get the religious person to name “examples of the faithful” who are immoral I’m confused as to how he’s been taken in by some popularist notion that ‘being religious’ makes you, by necessity, a virtuous person. Maybe this is a common problem in the United States but in the UK even religious people don’t tend to think that religious people are the ‘goodies’ and non-religious people are the ‘baddies’. That’s a very strange notion to me and it’s one which is quite foreign to historical Christianity as well. So, far from being the “shock and awe” moment Boghossian thinks it would be, this feels like another “Duh – of course!” moment to me.


I wonder what you think the word delusion means?

The Oxford Dictionary defines a delusion as:

“An idiosyncratic belief or impression maintained despite being contradicted by reality or rational argument, typically as a symptom of mental disorder.”

The Cambridge Dictionary has:

“Belief in something that is not true.”

Merriam Webster has:

“a belief that is not true : a false idea”

“a false idea or belief that is caused by mental illness”

a: “something that is falsely or delusively believed or propagated”

:  “a persistent false psychotic belief regarding the self or persons or objects outside the self that is maintained despite indisputable evidence to the contrary; also :  the abnormal state marked by such beliefs”

It appears to be uncontroversial to think that if one is claiming another person to be deluded that this means it can be shown that they hold to a belief which is obviously false and that this belief may well be so seriously false as to qualify as a mental disorder. These appear to be the two common meanings of the word in English usage.

Here come the word games again!

Now notice what Boghossian does with the word deluded:

“The difference between misconstruing reality and being delusional is the willingness to revise a belief. If I’m genuinely willing to revise my belief I’m less likely to think it’s a delusion. ‘Are you willing to revise your belief that [insert belief here]?’ Posing this as a question is helpful because it gently reinforces the idea that they’re harboring a delusion without telling them they’re delusional.” [Loc.1441]

The section in this chapter where Boghossian discusses this is called ‘shortcuts’ and it’s where he talks about the importance of being open to having one’s views changed. Because Boghossian focuses so much on belief revision in this section it pretty much sounds as if he thinks the single most important criterion for a delusion is an unwillingness to revise one’s belief. In fact, that is the criterion he uses between a delusion and merely being mistaken. But that opens a whole can of worms. People generally have plenty of beliefs they are mostly unwilling to have challenged. People like to sound certain about their existence, about the love they feel for their children, about the wrongness of genocide, and about which football team is the greatest. Are people ‘deluded’ merely on the basis that they lack a willingness to revise their beliefs on such matters? That would certainly be a highly controversial linguistic proposal. In reality it’s a serious watering down of what the word delusional commonly is taken to mean. Personally, I am not open to revising my belief that I love my children. I know that as fundamentally as anything I could possibly know. Does that mean I am deluded? Well according to Boghossian’s new reworking of the definition of the word – yes. Am I bothered he thinks I’m deluded that I love my children? Not in the slightest!

If Boghossian would add the requirement about the belief being “obviously false” (and, in this section at least, he does not make it clear whether he would or not) then Boghossian has a very serious problem. The problem is that theism is not generally regarded as being obviously false (certainly not among professional philosophers – even ones who are atheists) and Boghossian has not yet made any case for theism being obviously false in his book. So if Boghossian wants to classify theism as a delusion, in the more traditional sense of being obviously false, then he has his work cut out. He needs not only to demonstrate it as being obviously false to his own satisfaction but also to the general satisfaction of his peers. But he hasn’t done that. In fact, he is not published in the field of philosophy of religion at all to date.

This is why I think he is changing the common meaning of the word. By doing so he gets to accuse people of being deluded but what many people won’t spot is that he means something very different by the term. It leaves him without the burden of needing to demonstrate theism to be demonstrably false.


So in order to announce, as frequently as he does, that ‘people of faith are deluded’ Boghossian has watered this sentence down to mean ‘people who pretend to know things they don’t know are unwilling to revise their beliefs’. The second sentence is far less controversial than the first sounds (according to traditional definitions and common usage) and, in fact, many religious people could logically agree with the second. So he’s not being anywhere as near as controversial as he first sounds when you take the nuances of his translation into account. (Although it’s worth noting that the statement is not true analytically a priori and would require some serious evidence to establish – evidence he doesn’t bother giving. In fact, I have encountered plenty of examples of people pretending to know things who have been open to correction. I think that causes his contention to be a dubious one at least.)

In this section there also appears to be some incredible irony going on. Boghossian advises the SE to ask the person of ‘faith’ what it would take for them to change their belief (to create a moment of “doxastic openness”).

When he applies the same question to himself, however, this is what he says:

“If they’ve asked me what it would take for me to believe, I’ll use a variation of American physicist Lawrence Krauss’s example in his debate with William Lane Craig: if I walk outside at night and all of the stars were organized to read, “I am God communicating with you, believe in Me!” and every human being worldwide witnessed this in their native language, this would be suggestive (but far from conclusive as it’s a perception and could be a delusion).” [Loc.1422]


I claim this to be ironic because it appears that Boghossian is more or less admitting that there is virtually nothing which would be able to change his mind! He appears to be saying that any evidence based on his perception could be a delusion. But then – what evidence is there which does not depend on some sort of personal perception? How can he reasonably escape that? Boghossian appears to be claiming that the only degree of evidence which would be able to change his mind on the question of God’s existence is some degree of evidence so strong that it would prove God exists to everyone on the planet beyond a shadow of possible doubt and in some way he does not have to depend on his own perceptions. If that’s not obfuscating on the question then I don’t know what is. I have already claimed that Boghossian is guilty of ‘going nuclear’ when it comes to possible evidence for the existence of God and this passage in his book appears to demonstrate this point even more clearly. The complete and utter irony of all this is just hilarious.

If a theist used this kind of response this is what it would sound like:

‘I will change my mind on whether God exists or not if you can prove to me that God does not exist but do so in such a way that the proof does not depend on my perceptions in any way and also in a way which convinces everybody on the planet as well.’ 

Do I think that Boghossian would accept that as a serious suggestion that this theist was doxastically open to being shown to be wrong? Of course not. I think he would suggest this requirement is an unreasonably high one but it is the requirement Boghossian himself uses regarding his own doxastic openness.

Could it be, therefore, that one of the most important epistemological virtues Boghossian extols is one he himself lacks?

In this lecture below Boghossian talks about how “forthright speech” is important. He says that speaking clearly, honestly, and directly is a must when discussing these issues. [See especially 3:01-4:21.]

He says:

“If everyone were authentic we wouldn’t have to figure out what others mean because everyone would say what they actually mean. And saying what we mean is essential because the only way to solve problems is by speaking clearly, honestly, and directly.”

It is my contention that Peter Boghossian is not following his own advice. You have to do a LOT of digging to figure out what he is talking about. And one thing is certain – a common dictionary won’t help you understand him much either!

What most people will hear when he says ‘people of faith are deluded’ and what he means are two very different things. Boghossian takes words which have common meanings (as expressed clearly in the dictionary) and then he uses them in very different ways insisting that his usage of the word is the only authentic one. He ignores what other people mean by the use of these words which actually causes communication and dialogue to be more problematic than it was before.

Boghossian contends that clear speech and willingness to revise beliefs are integral indicators of authenticity. Since I have shown that he constantly uses words with obscure, personalized, idiosyncratic meanings and he does not appear to know what evidence could change his mind on whether God exists or not I am therefore forced to ask myself whether Boghossian is himself authentic according to his own criteria.

If I am going to ‘fight the fakers’ I must therefore fight Peter Boghossian.



PS. I could easily offer you two quick ways you could overthrow my theism. One a priori and one a posteriori. If you could demonstrate using logic that the mere Christian concept of God is illogical then you could demonstrate God is a priori untenable. Secondly, a posteriori, if you could show that Jesus never existed or that the records of his teachings are fakes or that he did not rise from the dead bodily – then I would have to revise my beliefs completely.


2nd June 2014

This is what Peter Boghossian just tweeted:

ScreenHunter_378 Jun. 02 08.33

If you consider yourself an agnostic, in the sense given in the dictionary (any but the Boghossian edition of course), you might feel a little annoyed that Boghossian is rebranding you in order to take such a cheap shot. If you feel this way then you have an important insight in what it’s like being a theist because this is exactly what Boghossian does to theism all the time as well.

Also, if Boghossian is to be taken at his word, this means he’s moved on from his position that he is not a 7 on the ‘Dawkins’ scale’. If it’s completely impossible that God exist then Boghossian must have now moved to a 7. But this means he knows there is no God and if he knows that then he cannot revise his belief. But Boghossian has previously said that any claims not open to revision are delusions! So is Boghossian deluded once more?!


Posted in Atheism, Atheist apologists, Epistemology, Faith, New Atheism, Street Epistemology | Tagged | 2 Comments